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Regularity of Nash payoffs of Markovian nonzero-sum
stochastic differential games.
Said Hamadene∗ and Paola Mannucci†
Abstract. In this paper we deal with the problem of existence of a smooth solution of the Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs (HJBI for short) system of equations associated with nonzero-sum stochastic
differential games. We consider the problem in unbounded domains either in the case of continuous
generators or for discontinuous ones. In each case we show the existence of a smooth solution of
the system. As a consequence, we show that the game has smooth Nash payoffs which are given by
means of the solution of the HJBI system and the stochastic process which governs the dynamic
of the controlled system.
Key words: Nash equilibrium point; Nonzero-sum stochastic differential game; Nash payoff; Back-
ward SDE; HJBI system of equations; Sobolev space.
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1 Introduction
This article deals with a nonzero-sum stochastic differential game (NZSDG for short) which we
describe hereafter. Let us consider a system, on which intervene two players π1 and π2, whose
dynamics is given by a solution of a stochastic differential equation of the following form:
dxu1,u2t = f(t, x
u1,u2
t , u1t, u2t)dt+ σ(t, x
u1,u2
t )dBt, t ≤ T and xu1,u20 = x ∈ IRN (1.1)
where:
(i) B := (Bt)t≤T is a Brownian motion ;
(ii) u1 := (u1t)t≤T (resp. u2 := (u2t)t≤T ) is a stochastic process with values in U1 (resp.
U2) a compact metric space and adapted w.r.t (Ft)t≤T , the completed natural filtration of B. The
process u1 (resp. u2) is the way by which the first (resp. second) player π1 (resp. π2) acts on the
system ;
(iii) f(·) and σ(·) are given functions.
The system that one implies could be an asset in the financial market, an economic unit, a factor
in the economic or financial spheres, etc. On the other hand, one can consider the differential game
with more than two players and this does not rise a major issue, the treatment is the same.
The conditional payoff of player π1 (resp. π2) from t to T , when she implements u1 (resp.
u2), is denoted J
1
t (u1, u2) (resp. J
2
t (u1, u2)) and given by: for i = 1, 2,
J it (u1, u2) = E[
∫ T
t
hi(s, x
u1,u2
s , u1s, u2s)ds+ gi(x
u1,u2
T )|Ft].
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The functions h1, h2 (resp. g1, g2) stand for the intantaneous (resp. terminal) payoffs of the players
π1, π2, respectively. Then the problem of interest is to find a Nash equilibrium point for the game,
i.e., a pair of controls of the players (u∗1, u
∗
2) such that
J10 (u
∗
1, u
∗
2) ≥ J10 (u1, u∗2) and J20 (u∗1, u∗2) ≥ J20 (u∗1, u∗2) for any u1, u2.
On the other hand it is important to highlight the regularity properties of the conditional payoffs
J it (u
∗
1, u
∗
2), t ≤ T , i = 1, 2, called conditional Nash payoffs of the game. The meaning of (u∗1, u∗2) is
that none of the players gains if she/he decides to deviate unilaterally.
In bounded domains this topic is already considered, e.g. in the monograph by Bensoussan-
Frehse [4]. So far there are many papers which deal with nonzero-sum stochastic differential games
in a framework similar to ours, among which one can quote [2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 12, 13, 14, 11, 19, 20].
They can be divided into three categories. In the first category one can group the works where the
non-zerosum game is tackled by using probabilitic tools, namely backward stochastic differential
equations (BSDE for short) [12, 13, 14]; to solve the problem it is enough to solve its associated
BSDE which is multi-dimensional with non-Lipschitz coefficient. However this solvability is not
obvious and it is achieved only in the Markovian framework. The latter papers are related to
various features of the data of the game, e.g., they are bounded in [12] while this boudedness is
partially removed in [14] and finally, in [13], the authors consider the case when the coefficients of
the multi-dimensional BSDE associated with the game are discontinuous and the Nash point is of
bang-bang type. In the second category one can gather the papers which use PDEs to tackle this
non-zerosum differential game problem [2, 3, 4, 8, 19, 20]. Mainly in those works, firstly the authors
provide a regular solution for the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman system of equations associated with
the game and then construct a Nash equilibrium point. More precisely, in the papers [2, 3, 4, 8]
the existence of Nash equilibria are proved under the assumption that the feedback is continuous,
while in [19, 20] the study is done loosing continuity of the feedback and hence of the Hamiltonians.
Finally in the third category one can range papers, rather rare, where a mix of both of the previous
methods are used, e.g., in [5, 11]. Note that in [5], the controls are of relaxed type.
The general case of path dependent process (xu1,u2t )t≤T solution of (1.1) is still open since,
as pointed out previously, to tackle this type of nonzero-sum SDG leads to deal with a multidi-
mensional BSDE with non Lipschitz coefficients and non markovian randomness, for which there
is a lack of result (see for instance [7]).
The probabilistic approach can be described as: Let Hi, i = 1, 2, be the Hamiltonians
associated with this game problem, i.e., for i = 1, 2 and (t, x, u1, u2, p1, p2) ∈ [0, T ]× IRN × U1 ×
U2 × IRN+N ,
Hi(t, x, pi, u1, u2) := p
⊤
i f(t, x, u1, u2) + hi(t, x, u1, u2) (1.2)
and assume that the following generalized Isaacs condition (GIC for short) is satisfied:
(A0): There exist measurable functions u¯1(t, x, p1, p2) and u¯2(t, x, p1, p2) valued respectively in U1
and U2 such that for any (t, x, p1, p2, u1, u2),
H1(t, x, p1, u¯1(t, x, p1, p2), u¯2(t, x, p1, p2)) ≥ H1(t, x, p1, u1, u¯2(t, x, p1, p2))
and
H2(t, x, p2, u¯1(t, x, p1, p2), u¯2(t, x, p1, p2)) ≥ H2(t, x, p2, u¯1(t, x, p1, p2), u2).
(1.3)
This condition is the analogous of the Isaacs one in the framework of zero-sum differential games.
Next assume there exist adapted stochastic processes (Y 1, Y 2, Z1, Z2), solution of the fol-
lowing system of two coupled BSDEs: for i = 1, 2{
Y it = gi(xT ) +
∫ T
t
Hi(s, xs, σ
−1(s, xs)
⊤Zis, (u¯1, u¯2)(s, xs, σ
−1(s, xs)
⊤Z1s , σ
−1(s, xs)
⊤Z2s ))ds
− ∫ T
t
ZisdBs, t ≤ T,
(1.4)
where (xt)t≤T is the solution of (1.1) without drift term (see (2.2) below) then
(u∗1, u
∗
2) := (u¯1(t, xt, Z
1,σ
t , Z
2,σ
t ), u¯2(t, xt, Z
1,σ
t , Z
2,σ
t ))t≤T (with Z
i,σ
t = σ
−1(t, xt)
⊤Zit , i = 1, 2) is a
Nash equilibrium point for the nonzero-sum differential game and Y it = J
i
t (u
∗
1, u
∗
2), i = 1, 2. Thus
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the problem turns into looking for a solution of the two-dimesional BSDE (1.4) which is associated
with the game problem. This point of view has been considered among others in [12, 14], where
the existence of a Nash point for the game is shown under appropriate assumptions on the data
of the problem. It must be said that the link between the processes Y i and Zi which allows for
the construction of the Nash equilibrium point of the game is not very well understood. Mainly
because there is a need of further regularity properties of the processes Y i, i = 1, 2, which are not
established yet.
As written before, the second approach uses partial differential equations tools (see e.g.
[3, 8, 9, 19, 20] and the references therein) and mainly it turns into seeking a regular solution of
the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs equations associated with this game problem, under various
assumptions on the regularity of the feedbacks, which is the following: for i = 1, 2,

−∂tV i(t, x)− 12Tr[σσ⊤(t, x)D2xxV i(t, x)]
−∇xV i(t, x).f(t, x, (u¯1, u¯2)(t, x,∇xV 1(t, x),∇xV 2(t, x)))
−hi(t, x, (u¯1, u¯2)(t, x,∇xV 1(t, x),∇xV 2(t, x))) = 0, (t, x) ∈ RT := (0, T )× IRN ;
V i(T, x) = gi(x), for x ∈ IRN .
(1.5)
This system is the verification theorem of the NZSD game problem. Indeed if a regular solution
of (1.5) exists then by the use of Itoˆ-Krylov formula to V i(t, xt) one obtains that the pair of
controls (u∗1, u
∗
2) := ((u¯1, u¯2)(t, xt,∇xV 1(t, xt),∇xV 2(t, xt)))t≤T is a Nash equilibrium point for
the game and additionally J it (u
∗
1, u
∗
2) = V
i(t, xt), i = 1, 2. This approach provides also more
regular properties of the Nash payoffs of the game which we cannot obtain from the probabilistic
one. This is helpful at least in: i) the understanding of the link between J it (u
∗
1, u
∗
2), i = 1, 2, and
(u∗1, u
∗
2) ; ii) the simulation process of either the Nash payoffs or the Nash equilibrium points where
usually smoothness properties of the data are required. However, to the best of our knowlegde,
system of equations (1.5), with lack of regularity on ui, is studied only in the case when the domain
RT is bounded. Therefore the main objective of this work is to deal with the same problem when
RT is unbounded. Note that, for unbounded domains, a verification result for Markovian feedback
controls can be obtained (see e.g. Theorem 8.5 of [6]).
This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we introduce precisely the nonzero-sum differential
game which we will study later on. Section 3 is devoted to the study of the HJBI system (1.5)
associated with the NZSDG. We consider three different cases. In the first one we show that the
system has a solution when the data of the problem are mainly continuous and bounded. Then we
treat the case when the data are bounded discontinuous and finally we deal with the case when
the Hamiltonian are discontinuous and the data have linear or polynomial growth. In Section 4,
we study the connection of the solutions of the system with the NZSDG problem. We provide the
Nash equilibrium point for the game and some regularity properties of its conditional Nash payoffs.
2 Statement of the NZSDG problem
Let (Ω,F, P ) be a probability space which carries a N -dimensional Brownian motion (Bt)t≤T
whose completed natural filtration is (Ft = σ{Ws, s ≤ T })t≤T and P is the σ-algebra on [0, T ]×Ω
of Ft-progressively measurable processes.
Let σ be a Borel measurable function from [0, T ]× IRN into IRN×N which satisfies the following
assumptions:
(A1):
(i) σ ∈ C2((0, T )× IRN ) and is uniformly Lipschitz in x i.e. there exists a constant C such that:
∀t ∈ [0, T ], x, x′ ∈ IRN ,
|σ(t, x) − σ(t, x′)| ≤ C|x− x′|.
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(ii) σ is bounded, invertible and its inverse is bounded.
Note that condition (ii) is equivalent to the existence of a constant α > 0 such that for any (t, x),
α−1I ≤ σ(t, x)σ⊤(t, x) ≤ αI (2.1)
i.e., σσ⊤ is uniformly elliptic (σ⊤ is the transpose of σ).
Next let (Xt)t≤T be the process solution of the following stochastic differential equation
Xt = x+
∫ t
0
σ(s,Xs)dBs, t ≤ T and x ∈ IRN . (2.2)
Since σ verifies (A1), the process (Xt)t≤T exists and is unique (see e.g. [16, 21] for more details).
Next let us denote by U1 and U2 two compact metric spaces, meanwhile, M1 and M2 are the sets
of the P-measurable processes with values in U1 and U2 subsets of IRki , ki ∈ IN \ {0}, i = 1, 2,
respectively. The set M =M1 ×M2 is called of admissible controls for players π1 and π2.
Now let f (resp. hi, i = 1, 2) be borelian functions from [0, T ]× IRN ×U1 ×U2 into IRN (resp. IR)
and gi another borelian function from IRN to IR such that for some constants C ≥ 0 and γ ≥ 0 it
holds: for i = 1, 2,
(A2) :
(i) |f(t, x, u1, u2)| ≤ C(1 + |x|), for any (t, x, u1, u2) ∈ [0, T ]× IRN × U1 × U2;
(ii) |gi(x)|+ |hi(t, x, u1, u2)| ≤ C(1 + |x|γ), γ ≥ 1, for any x ∈ IRN .
For (u1, u2) ∈M , let P (u1,u2)be the probability on (Ω,F) defined as follows:
dP (u1,u2) = ζ(
∫ .
0
σ−1(s,Xs)f(s,Xs, u1s, u2s)dBs).dP (2.3)
where for any (Ft, P )-continuous local martingale M = (Mt)t≤T , the density function ζ(M) is
defined by:
ζ(M) = (ζ(M)t)t≤T := (exp{Mt − 1
2
〈M〉t})t≤T (2.4)
with (〈M〉t)t≤T is the increasing adapted process associated with M , i.e. (M2t −〈M〉t)t≤T is a local
martingale.
Under assumptions (A1) and (A2), the non-negative measure P (u1,u2) is a probability which
is equivalent to P ([16], p. 200) and by the Girsanov Theorem [10] the process B(u1,u2) = (Bt −∫ t
0 σ
−1(s,Xs)f(s,Xs, u1s, u2s)ds)t≤T is an (Ft, P (u1,u2))-Brownian motion andX is a weak solution
of the following stochastic differential equation
dXt = f(t,Xt, u1t, u2t)dt+ σ(t,Xt)dB
(u1,u2)
t , t ≤ T and X0 = x. (2.5)
For i= 1,2, we define the conditional payoffs of players π1 and π2 respectively by
J it (u1, u2) = E
(u1,u2)[
∫ T
t
hi(s,Xs, u1s, u2s)ds+ g
i(XT )|Ft] (2.6)
where E(u1,u2)is the expectation under the probability P (u1,u2). Note that when t = 0, J i0(u1, u2)
is nothing but E(u1,u2)[
∫ T
0 hi(s,Xs, u1s, u2s)ds + g
i(XT )] since F0 contains only P -null sets and
Pu1,u2 is equivalent to P .
The problem is to find a Nash equilibrium point for the game, i.e. an admissible control (u∗, v∗)
such that for any (u1, u2) ∈M
J10 (u
∗
1, u
∗
2) ≥ J10 (u1, u∗2) and J20 (u∗1, u∗2) ≥ J20 (u∗1, u2)
and, as much as possible, to highlight the properties of (J1t (u
∗
1, u
∗
2), J
2
t (u
∗
1, u
∗
2))t≤T . ✷
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3 The PDE study of the HJBI associated with the NZSDG
Firstly, recall once for all that we assume that the GIC introduced in Assumption (A0) is fulfilled.
We will consider the HJBI system associated with the NZSDG under different assumptions on the
data. We illustrate three cases to show the different techniques of the proof when we have lack
either of continuity or boundedness. In this way we obtain a generalization of results obtained
in bounded domains ([2, 19, 20]). In particular we will obtain the existence of a solution of the
parabolic system (suitably defined in dependence on the assumptions) in three cases:
Case 1: The data f , hi, gi are globally bounded and continuous with respect to all their en-
tries and ui(t, x, p1, p2), i = 1, 2, (see (1.3) for the definition) are continuous.
Example: Let us assume that N = 1, U1 = [0, 1], U2 = [−1, 1], f(t, x, u1, u2) = f1(t, x) − u1 − u2,
h1(t, x, u1, u2) = h¯1(t, x) − u21 and finally h2(t, x, u1, u2) = h¯2(t, x) − 2u22. Then the Generalized
Isaacs condition is satisfied with u1(t, x, p1) = ((− p12 )∧1))∨0 and u2(t, x, p2) = ((− p24 )∧1)∨(−1),
and obviously ui, i = 1, 2, are continuous.
Case 2: The data f , hi, gi are globally bounded and continuous with respect to all their entries,
the drift f has a separate structure, and the feedbacks ui(t, x, p1, p2), i = 1, 2, are not continuous
with respect to (p1, p2).
Example: Let us take N = 1, U1 = [0, 1], U2 = [−1, 1], f(t, x, u1, u2) = f1(t, x) + u1 + u2,
h1(t, x, u1, u2) = h2(t, x, u1, u2) = 0, with fi(t, x) bounded and continuous. Then the General-
ized Isaacs condition is satisfied with u1(t, x, p1) = 1{p1≥0} and u2(t, x, p2) = 1{p2≥0}−1{p2<0} and
obviously ui, i = 1, 2, are discontinuous.
Case 3: The data f , hi, gi are continuous with respect to all their entries but have a linear growth
w.r.t. x, the drift f has a separate structure and the feedbacks ui(t, x, p1, p2) are not continuous
with respect to (p1, p2).
Note that the example of Case 2 fits also for Case 3 if we choose f1(t, x) and gi(x), i = 1, 2,
continuous and with a linear growth w.r.t. x.
3.1 The HJBI system associated with the NZSDG
We denote by RT := (0, T ) × IRN the layer in IRN+1. Let us consider the following system of
PDEs which stands, after inverting time, for the HJBI system of the nonzero-sum differential game
introduced previously:
∂Vi(t, x)
∂t
−
N∑
h,k=1
ahk(t, x)
∂2Vi(t, x)
∂xh∂xk
= Hi(t, x,∇xVi(t, x), ui(t, x), uj(t, x)), i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j, in RT ,
(3.1)
Vi(0, x) = gi(x), i = 1, 2 x ∈ IRN ; (3.2)
u1(t, x) ∈ argmax{u1∈U1}H1(t, x,∇xV1(t, x), u1, u2(t, x)); (3.3)
u2(t, x) ∈ argmax{u2∈U2}H2(t, x,∇xV2(t, x), u1(t, x), u2), (3.4)
where a = 12σσ
⊤ is the matrix with entries ahk, h, k = 1, . . .N and the Hamiltonian Hi are defined
in (1.2).
Recall that, from assumption (A1), the matrix a(t, x) ∈ C2(RT ), is bounded and uniformly elliptic,
in the sense that for all (t, x) ∈ RT and for all ξ ∈ IRN ,
α−1|ξ|2 ≤
N∑
h,k=1
ahk(t, x)ξhξk ≤ α|ξ|2 (α > 0). (3.5)
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Let Ω ⊂ IRN be a bounded open domain and let us define ΩT :≡ (0, T ) × Ω and ∂pΩT :≡(
(0, T ) × ∂Ω) ∪ ({t = 0} × Ω). We denote by H1+α(ΩT ), α ∈ (0, 1), the set of functions v(t, x)
such that v is a α-Ho¨lder continuous function in ΩT together with its spatial derivatives
∂v
∂xi
,
i = 1, ..., N . The norm in H1+α is denoted by |v|(1+α). We denote by W 1,2q (ΩT ), q > 1, the set of
functions v(t, x) such that v and its weak derivatives ∂v∂t ,
∂v
∂xi
, ∂
2v
∂xi∂xj
belong to Lq(ΩT ). The norm
in W 1,2q (ΩT ) is denoted by ‖v‖(2)q .
3.2 Bounded continuous data and feedbacks
Let us study now HJBI system (3.1)-(3.4) under the assumptions of Case 1, i.e., the functions f ,
hi, gi, i = 1, 2, are globally bounded and continuous with respect to all their entries. Precisely we
assume that:
Assumption (H1):
(i) The functions f(t, x, u1, u2) and hi(t, x, u1, u2), i = 1, 2, are globally bounded in RT
and continuous in RT × U1 × U2; (3.6)
(ii) For i = 1, 2, gi(x) ∈ H1+α(Q), α ∈ (0, 1), for any bounded Q ⊂ IRN ,
and it is bounded and continuous in IRN ; (3.7)
(iii) For i = 1, 2, the mapping
(p1, p2) ∈ IRN+N 7→ Hi(t, x, pi, u¯1(t, x, p1, p2), u¯2(t, x, p1, p2)) ∈ IR is continuous. (3.8)
System (3.1)-(3.2) is a Cauchy problem for a quasilinear uniformly parabolic system in the layer
RT with equations strongly coupled by the functions
Hi(t, x,∇xVi(t, x), (u1, u2)(t, x,∇xV1(t, x),∇xV2(t, x))), i = 1, 2.
Definition 3.1 (V1, V2) is a strong solution of the system (3.1)-(3.4), if
a) V1(t, x), V2(t, x) ∈ L∞(RT ), (3.9)
b) V1(t, x), V2(t, x) ∈ H1+α(ΩT ) ∩W 1,2q (ΩT ), (3.10)
where for any bounded subdomain Ω ⊂ IRN , ΩT = (0, T )× Ω, α ∈ (0, 1), q > N + 2;
c) Equations (3.1), (3.3), (3.3) hold almost everywhere in ΩT and (3.2) holds in Ω.
Theorem 3.1 Under assumptions (3.5) and (H1), there exists a strong solution (V1, V2) of the
parabolic system (3.1)-(3.4) in the layer RT .
Proof. To prove the existence of a strong solution in any ΩT = (0, T )× Ω, where Ω ⊂ IRN is any
bounded domain, let us consider the following problem in a sequence of expanding domains of the
form BR,T := (0, T )× B(0, R) where B(0, R) := {|x| < R} (clearly, if R→ +∞, BR,T → RT ):
∂V R1 (t, x)
∂t
−
N∑
h,k=1
ahk(t, x)
∂2V R1 (t, x)
∂xh∂xk
= H1(t, x,∇xV R1 (t, x), u1(t, x,∇xV R1 ,∇xV R2 ), u2(t, x,∇xV R1 ,∇xV R2 )), in BR,T ; (3.11)
∂V R2 (t, x)
∂t
−
N∑
h,k=1
ahk(t, x)
∂2V R2 (t, x)
∂xh∂xk
= H2(t, x,∇xV R2 (t, x), u1(t, x,∇xV R1 ,∇xV R2 ), u2(t, x,∇xV R1 ,∇xV R2 )), in BR,T ; (3.12)
V Ri (t, x) = gi(x), i = 1, 2, in ∂pBR,T := {(t, x) ∈ RT , |x| = R} ∪ {(t, x) ∈ RT , t = 0}. (3.13)
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Remark that this auxiliary problem is compatible with our initial nonzero-sum game problem.
In fact if a solution (V R1 (t, x), V
R
2 (t, x)) exists and both functions belong to W
1,2
p (BR,T ) then, by
setting (V
R
1 (t, x), V
R
2 (t, x)) = (V
R
1 (T − t, x), V R2 (T − t, x)) and using the Itoˆ-Krylov formula (see
e.g. [17], Theorem 2.10.1) we have the following characterization: for i = 1, 2,
V
R
i (0, x) = J
R
i (u1, u2) := E
u¯1,u¯2
{∫ τR
0
hi(s,Xs, (u1, u2)(s))ds+ gi(XτR)
}
(3.14)
where:
(i) (Xs)s≤T is the stochastic process defined in (2.2) ;
(ii) τR ≡ T ∧ inf{s ≥ t,X(s) /∈ BR} ;
(iii) (u1, u2) := ((u1, u2)(s))s≤T = ((u1, u2)(s,Xs,∇xV R1 (s,Xs),∇xV
R
2 (s,Xs)))s≤T .
Moreover the pair (u1, u2) is a Nash equilibrium point for the nonzero-sum differential game defined
with the same data f , hi, gi, Ui, i=1,2, etc. but which terminates at the random time τR (see
Theorem 4.1 for more details). Finally note that if x ∈ ∂B(0, R) then τR = 0 and V Ri (0, x) = gi(x).
To prove the existence of a solution (V R1 , V
R
2 ) of problem (3.11)-(3.13) we use a standard
bootstrap argument and we find uniform estimates which will allow us to prove the convergence
to the solution we are looking for.
Let {V R1n(t, x), V R2n(t, x)}, n ≥ 1, be the solution of the following system:
∂V R1n
∂t
−
N∑
h,k=1
ahk(t, x)
∂2V R1n
∂xh∂xk
= H1(t, x,∇xV R1n(t, x), (u1, u2)(t, x,∇xV R1(n−1)(t, x),∇xV R2(n−1)(t, x))) in BR,T ; (3.15)
∂V R2n
∂t
−
N∑
h,k=1
ahk(t, x)
∂2V R2n
∂xh∂xk
= H2(t, x,∇xV R2n(t, x), (u1, u2)(t, x,∇xV R1(n−1)(t, x),∇xV R2(n−1)(t, x))) in BR,T ; (3.16)
V Rin (t, x) = gi(x), i = 1, 2, on ∂pBR,T . (3.17)
Note that this is a linear system of parabolic equations, but those latter are decoupled. Next
as f , hi and gi, i = 1, 2, are bounded functions in RT , then from Theorem 9.1 p.341 of [18]
and Lemma 3.3, Chapter 2 p.80 [18] there exists an unique solution of problem (3.15)-(3.17),
V R1n, V
R
2n ∈W 1,2(BR,T ) such that
‖V Rin‖(2)q,BR,T ≤ C
(
‖f‖q,BR,T , ‖hi‖q,BR,T , ‖gi‖2−1/qq,∂pBR,T
)
, i = 1, 2, (3.18)
where C is a constant which does not depend on n and R. By means of the Sobolev embedding
theorem we also have
‖V Rin‖(1+α)BR,T ≤ C, α = 1− N+2q , i = 1, 2, (3.19)
where C is a constant which does not depend on n and on R.
By (3.19) and Ascoli-Arzela` Theorem, we can extract two subsequences, which we denote
again by V R1n, V
R
2n such that
V Rin → V Ri ,
∂V Rin
∂xh
→ ∂V
R
i
∂xh
, in C0(BR,T ), i = 1, 2, h = 1, . . .N, (3.20)
and, from (3.18) and the weak precompactness of the unit ball of W 2,1q , we have also
∂V Rin
∂t
⇀
∂V Ri
∂t
,
∂2V Rin
∂xh∂xk
⇀
∂2V Ri
∂xh∂xk
, weakly in L2(BR,T ), i = 1, 2, h, k = 1, . . .N. (3.21)
From (3.20), (3.21), V R1 , V
R
2 ∈ H1+α(BR,T ) ∩W 1,2q (BR,T ), with α = 1− N+2q .
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Next the following decomposition holds true:
H1(t, x,∇xV R1n(t, x), (u1, u2)(t, x,∇xV R1(n−1)(t, x),∇xV R2(n−1)(t, x)))
= (∇xV R1n(t, x)−∇xV R1(n−1)(t, x))f(t, x, (u1, u2)(t, x,∇xV R1(n−1)(t, x),∇xV R2(n−1)(t, x)))+
H1(t, x,∇xV R1(n−1)(t, x), (u1, u2)(t, x,∇xV R1(n−1)(t, x),∇xV R2(n−1)(t, x))).
The first term, as n→∞, converges to 0 since f is bounded and
(∇xV R1n(t, x)−∇xV R1,n−1(t, x))→n 0 while the second one converges to
H1(t, x,∇xV R1 (t, x), (u1, u2)(t, x,∇xV R1 (t, x),∇xV R2 (t, x)))
by the continuity of assumption (A3)-(ii). We can do the same for the quantity
H2(t, x,∇xV R2n(t, x), (u1, u2)(t, x,∇xV R1(n−1)(t, x),∇xV R2(n−1)(t, x)))
which converges, as n→∞, to
H2(t, x,∇xV R2 (t, x), (u1, u2)(t, x,∇xV R1 (t, x),∇xV R2 (t, x))).
Going back now to (3.15)-(3.17), take the limit w.r.t n to obtain that {V R1 , V R2 } solve equations
(3.11)-(3.13) almost everywhere in BR,T and V
R
i = gi, i = 1, 2, on ∂pBR,T .
Moreover from the boundedness of the data of the problem, applying the maximum principle
([18], Theorem 2.1, p.13) in BR,T we obtain that the solution V
R
i of (3.11)-(3.13) is such that
‖V R1 , V R2 ‖∞ ≤ C, (3.22)
where C does not depend on R hence they are uniformly bounded. From the previous estimate
(3.22) we can say that for any R0 > 0 and V
R
i with R > R0 we have
‖V Ri ‖(2)q,BR0,T ≤ C(R0), i = 1, 2. (3.23)
where the constant C(R0) depends on R0 but not on R.
Now by employing the usual diagonal process we can extract from the sequence {V Ri } a
subsequence which we call again {V Ri } that converges together with the first derivatives ∇xV Ri at
each point of RT to some functions Vi, and such that ∇tV Ri , D2xxV Ri converge weakly in L2(ΩT )
to ∇tVi, D2xxVi respectively for any ΩT ⊂ RT with Ω bounded subset of IRN . Now from (3.22)
Vi(t, x) are bounded in RT . Hence
‖Vi‖(2)q,ΩT ≤ C(ΩT ), i = 1, 2, (3.24)
for any ΩT ⊂ RT . Moreover Vi(t, x), i = 1, 2, solve problem (3.1)-(3.2) in any ΩT ⊂ RT with Ω
bounded subset of IRN , i.e. is a strong solution of the problem (see also Section 8, p.492-493 of
[18]). ✷
3.3 Bounded data and discontinuous Hamiltonian.
In this subsection we consider the case where the generalized Isaacs condition (A0) is satisfied with
discontinous functions ui(t, x, p1, p2), i = 1, 2, w.r.t (p1, p2). To better understand the problem we
start with an example where the feedback can be written in an explicit way. This problem was
considered in [19] for bounded domains and in [13] in IRN .
For the sake of brevity here in the following HJBI equation and also in the next section we denote
by Vy the derivative
∂V
∂y with respect to a generic variable y.
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We take an affine structure of f and hi, i.e.,
f(t, x, u1, u2) = f1(t, x)u1 + f2(t, x)u2, where for i = 1, 2,
fi : (0, T )× IRN → IR, fi ∈ C1([0, T ]× IRN ) and bounded ; (3.25)
hi : (0, T )× IRN × U1 × U2 → IR, hi(t, x, u1, u2) = hi(t, x)ui with
hi : (0, T )× IRN → IR, hi ∈ C1([0, T ]× IRN ) and bounded , i = 1, 2. (3.26)
From (3.25)-(3.26) we have:
H1(t, x, p, u1, u2) = (p · f1(t, x) + h1(t, x))u1 + p · f2(t, x)u2, (3.27)
H2(t, x, p, u1, u2) = (p · f2(t, x) + h2(t, x))u2 + p · f1(t, x)u1.
We take as control sets
U1 = U2 = [0, 1]. (3.28)
In this case it is possible to find an explicit expression to argmax{ui∈Ui}Hi(t, x, p, ui) = Heav(p ·
fi(t, x) + hi(t, x)), i = 1, 2. Here Heav(η) is the set valued Heaviside graph, Heav(η) = 1, if η > 0,
Heav(η) = 0 if η < 0, Heav(0) = [0, 1], i.e. Heav(η) is a multivalued function from IR to IR that
associates to each point η ∈ IR a set Heav(η) ⊆ IR. In this case we can explicitely see that the
optimal feedbacks ui(t, x, p) ∈ argmax{ui∈Ui}Hi(t, x, p, ui) = Heav(p · fi(t, x) + hi(t, x)) are not
continuous with respect to the variable p and the generalised Isaacs condition (A0) is satisfied with
discontinuous functions ui, i = 1, 2, w.r.t (p1, p2).
Hence the terms on the right hand sides contain multivalued functions and the system (3.1)-(3.2)
becomes
V1t −
∑
h,k
ahkV1xhxk = (∇xV1 · f1 + h1)u1 +∇xV1 · f2 u2, (3.29)
V2t −
∑
h,k
ahkV2xhxk = (∇xV2 · f2 + h2)u2 +∇xV2 · f1 u1,
u1(t, x,∇xV1) ∈ Heav((∇xV1 · f1 + h1)(t, x)),
u2(t, x,∇xV2) ∈ Heav((∇xV2 · f2 + h2)(t, x)),
Vi(0, x) = gi(x).
that can be written also as: ∀(t, x) ∈ RT ,
V1t − ahkV1xhxk ∈ (V1x · f1 + h1)Heav(V1x · f1 + h1) + V1x · f2Heav(V2x · f2 + h2) ;
V2t − ahkV2xhxk ∈ (V2x · f2 + h2)Heav(V2x · f2 + h2) + V2x · f1Heav(V1x · f1 + h1) ;
Vi(0, x) = gi(x), x ∈ IRN . (3.30)
In the following theorem we strongly use the explicit expression of the Hamiltonian to get the
existence result.
Theorem 3.2 Under assumptions (3.5), (3.25)-(3.26), (3.28), (3.7) there exists a strong solution
(V1, V2) of the parabolic system (3.29) in the layer RT .
Proof. We follow the procedure used in [19] in bounded domains. We approximate the Heaviside
graph by a smooth sequence Hn and we consider the solution V
R
in of the corresponding Dirichlet
problem in a bounded domain BR,T as in the previous theorems where the boundary condition
is V Rin = gi(x) on ∂pBR,T . Note that, as in the previous section (see proof of Theorem 3.1), this
auxiliary Dirichlet problem is compatible with our game problem in all IRN .
There exists an unique solution {V R1n, V R2n} ∈W 1,2(BR,T ) and from the boundedness of Hn uniform
on n and the boundedness of gi, we obtain uniform estimates on n:
‖V Rin‖(2)q,BR,T ≤ C
(
‖Hn‖q,BR,T , ‖gi‖2−1/qq,∂pBR,T
)
= C(BR,T ), i = 1, 2. (3.31)
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where the constant C is independent on n.
By means of the Sobolev embedding theorem we also have
‖V Rin‖(1+α)BR,T ≤ C(BR,T ), α = 1− N+2q , i = 1, 2, (3.32)
where C is independent of n.
Still following the procedure of [19] we find a solution of Problem (3.29), {V R1 , V R2 } in BR,T and,
as in (3.23), we can say that for any R0 > 0 and V
R
i with R > R0 we have
‖V Ri ‖(2)q,BR0,T ≤ C(R0), i = 1, 2, (3.33)
where the constant C(R0) depends on R0 but not on R. Hence passing to the limit as R → +∞
we obtain a strong solution of (3.29). ✷
After the previous example we consider more general cases. Actually assume that: either
i) The game has separate dynamics and running payoffs and the functions are IR-valued
or
ii) The control sets are multidimensional compact sets and the dynamics is affine as in (3.25).
For bounded domains this type of problem was considered in [20], here we want to extend
it to unbounded domains. We make the following assumption:
Assumption (H2):
a)Ui are convex compact sets in IR
ki , ki ∈ IN, ki ≥ 1, i = 1, 2; (3.34)
b) f : (0, T )× IRN × U1 × U2 → IRN , f(t, x, u1, u2) = f1(t, x, u1) + f2(t, x, u2) (3.35)
with fi : (0, T )× IRN × Ui → IRN , fi ∈ C1([0, T ]× IRN × Ui) and bounded, i = 1, 2;
c)hi : (0, T )× IRN × U1 × U2 → IR, hi(t, x, u1, u2) = hi(t, x, ui), with
hi : (0, T )× IRN × Ui → IR, hi ∈ C1([0, T ]× IRN × Ui) and bounded, i = 1, 2; (3.36)
d) ∀p ∈ IRN , Ai(t, x, p) := argmax{ui∈Ui}
(
p⊤ · fi(t, x, ui) + hi(t, x, ui)
)
are convex sets in IRki , i = 1, 2. (3.37)
We state now the existence theorem in the case i).
Theorem 3.3 Let us suppose that N = 1. Under assumptions (3.5), (3.7), and (H2), i.e.(3.34)-
(3.37), there exists a strong solution (V1, V2) of the parabolic system (3.29) in the layer RT .
Proof. We follow the lines of the proof in [20]. By Cellina’s approximation theorem we find a
sequence Ain(t, x, p) in a 1/n-neighbourhood of the graph of
Ai(t, x, p) := argmax{ui∈Ui}
(
p · fi(t, x, ui) + hi(t, x, ui)
)
. We consider the solution V Rin of the cor-
responding Dirichlet problem in a bounded domain BR,T as in Theorem (3.2). We obtain uniform
estimate on n and the convergence to V Ri solution of system (3.29) in BR,T . Hence by the diagonal
procedure and passing to the limit as R → +∞ we obtain a strong solution of (3.29) in the layer
RT . ✷
Remark 3.1 The case ii) can be treated analogousy if additionnally to assumptions (H2) we require
that
f(t, x, u1, u2) = f1(t, x)u1 + f2(t, x)u2.
However we do not require N = 1 as in Theorem (3.3). ✷
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3.4 Unbounded data, discontinuous Hamiltonian, unbounded domains.
In this section we want to study from the PDEs point of view the game studied in the paper [13]
with probabilistic tools. We consider a stochastic game where the drift of the dynamics of the
system is of type
f(t, x, u1, u2) = f1(t, x)u1 + f2(t, x)u2 + ϕ(t, x),
where 

a) fi, i = 1, 2, and ϕ are continuous ;
b) max{|f1(t, x)|, |f2(t, x)|, |ϕ(t, x)|} ≤ C(1 + |x|), ∀(t, x) ∈ RT .
(3.38)
Moreover we suppose that the terminal payoffs satisfy:
For i = 1, 2, gi is continuous and |gi(x)| ≤ C(1 + |x|β), β ≥ 1, x ∈ IRN . (3.39)
Without loss of generality we suppose that the running payoffs hi = 0, i = 1, 2, and U1 = U2 = [0, 1].
In this case the Hamiltonians become
H1(t, x, p, u1, u2) = p · (f1(t, x)u1 + f2(t, x)u2 + ϕ(t, x)) , (3.40)
H2(t, x, p, u1, u2) = p · (f1(t, x)u1 + f2(t, x)u2 + ϕ(t, x)) .
Hence also in this case the optimal feedbacks
ui(t, x, p) ∈ argmax{ui∈Ui}Hi(t, x, p, ui) = Heav(p · fi(t, x)) are not continuous with respect to the
variable p, and then the Hamiltonians do not have continuous dependence on ∇xV1, ∇xV2.
The system (3.1)-(3.4) becomes: ∀(t, x) ∈ RT ,
V1t −
∑
h,k
ahkV1xhxk = ∇xV1 · (f1u1 + f2 u2 + ϕ(t, x)), (3.41)
V2t −
∑
h,k
ahkV2xhxk = ∇xV2 · (f1u1 + f2 u2 + ϕ(t, x)),
Vi(0, x) = gi(x),
u1(t, x,∇xV1) ∈ Heav(∇xV1 · f1(t, x)),
u2(t, x,∇xV2) ∈ Heav(∇xV2 · f2(t, x)).
and can be written also as: ∀(t, x) ∈ RT ,
V1t − ahkV1xhxk ∈ ∇xV1 · (f1Heav(∇xV1 · f1) + f2Heav(∇xV2 · f2) + ϕ(t, x)) ; (3.42)
V2t − ahkV2xhxk ∈ ∇xV2 · (f1Heav(∇xV1 · f1) + f2Heav(∇xV2 · f2) + ϕ(t, x)) ;
Vi(0, x) = gi(x), x ∈ IRN .
This is a system with discontinuous and unbounded terms in an unbounded domain. Here below
we obtain two existence results. The first one gives a weak solution in all the strip RT and could be
considered as a general result for systems with unbounded coefficients and discontinuous Hamilto-
nians. The second one comes directly from the procedure used in the previous sections and allows
us to find a more regular solution but only in the bounded subdomains of RT . We want to write
here both the results even if for the existence of Nash equilibria is sufficient only the second one.
To obtain the first existence result we give a suitable definition of solution in the spaces L2,∞(RT )
and L2,2(RT ), following [1] and [15]:
Definition 3.2 The space Lp,q(QT ) := L
q [(0, T ), Lp(Q)] is the space where we define the following
norm: For w ∈ Lp,q(QT ) we have
‖w‖p,q,Q =
{∫ T
0
(
∫
Q
|w(t, x)|pdx)q/pdt
}1/q
.
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In the case either p or q are infinite ‖w‖p,q,Q is definite in a similar way using L∞ norm:
‖w‖p,∞,Q = essup(0,T )(
∫
Q
|w(t, x)|pdx)1/p.
Definition 3.3 A pair {V1, V2} is said a weak solution of Problem (3.42) in RT = (0, T )×IRN for
the initial condition gi(x) ∈ L2loc(IRN ) if Vi(t, x) ∈ L∞
[
(0, T ), L2loc(IR
N )
] ∩ L2[(0, T ), H1,2loc (IRN )]
and if Vi, i = 1, 2, satisfy∫∫
RT
{−V1Φt + ahkV1xhΦxk + ahkxkV1xhΦ (3.43)
−∇xV1 · (f1Heav(∇xV1 · f1) + f2Heav(∇xV2 · f2) + ϕ(t, x)) Φ(t, x)} dx dt = 0,∫∫
RT
{−V2Φt + ahkV2xhΦxk + ahkxkV2xhΦ
−∇xV2 · (f2Heav(∇xV2 · f2) + f1Heav(∇xV1 · f1) + ϕ(t, x)) Φ(t, x)} dx dt = 0,
for any Φ ∈ C10 (RT ). Moreover Vi(0, x) = gi(x), x ∈ IRN , i = 1, 2.
Theorem 3.4 Under assumption (3.5), (3.38), (3.39) there exists a weak solution of the Cauchy
problem (3.42). Moreover the solution {V1, V2} are locally Ho¨lder continuous on RT and satisfy
the following estimate
|Vi(t, x)| ≤ C(1 + |x|β), β ≥ 1, ∀(t, x) ∈ RT , (3.44)
where β is the growth exponent of assumption (3.39).
Proof. We use the results of [1] and [15] where linear parabolic Cauchy problems with possibly
discontinuous terms respectively in bounded and unbounded domains are considered. To get a
linear system, we use a bootstrap argument by defining a sequence of solutions V n1 , V
n
2 of the
following problem
V n1t −
∑
h,k
ahkV
n
1xhxk
= ∇xV n1 · (f1u(n−1)1 + f2 u(n−1)2 + ϕ), in RT ; (3.45)
V n2t −
∑
h,k
ahkV
n
2xhxk
= ∇xV n2 · (f1u(n−1)1 + f2 u(n−1)2 + ϕ), in RT ;
u
(n−1)
1 (t, x,∇xV (n−1)1 ) ∈ Heav(∇xV (n−1)1 · f1);
u
(n−1)
2 (t, x,∇xV (n−1)2 ) ∈ Heav(∇xV (n−1)2 · f2);
V ni (0, x) = gi(x), x ∈ IRN .
Conditions (A) p.34 of [15] are satisfied and, from the equiboundedness of ui, the constants involved
in this condition depend only on the growth assumption (3.38), in particular are independent on n.
Hence we can apply Theorem 2 p.41 of [15] and then there exists an unique weak solution {V n1 , V n2 }
of problem (3.45) in RT ′ = (0, T
′)× IRN where T ′ depends on the constant of conditions (A) p.34
of [15], i.e on the growth assumption (3.38) thus it is independent on n.
We now prove that in our case T ′ = T . Indeed the existence result cited above (Theorem 2 p. 41
of [15]) is based on Theorem 3 p. 639 of [1]. In this Theorem the author finds T ≤ Cγ where C
depends only on the bound of the diffusion term σ and γ comes from the assumption on the initial
data:
e−γ|x|
2
gi(x) ∈ L2(IRN ). (3.46)
In our case since gi have polynomial growth (see assumption (3.39)), assumption (3.46) is satisfied
for any γ > 0. Hence for any T > 0 we can choose a sufficiently small γ such that T ≤ Cγ , thus the
existence of the weak solution {V n1 , V n2 } of the problem (3.45) is proved for any T > 0.
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Moreover, still from Theorem 2 p. 41 of [15], there exists a constant µ independent on n such that
the following estimates hold
‖e−µ(1+|x|2)λV ni ‖22,∞,RT + ‖e−µ(1+|x|
2)λ∇xV ni ‖22,2,RT ≤ C, (3.47)
where λ is any number in (0, 1] and C depends only on the data i.e. is independent on n. At
this point, following the argument of [1] for the proof of Theorem 3 p. 640-641, from the weak
compactness of L2,2, up to subsequences, we have that there exist Vi and V i such that
e−µ(1+|x|
2)λV ni → e−µ(1+|x|
2)λVi
e−µ(1+|x|
2)λ∇xV ni → e−µ(1+|x|
2)λV i,
where the convergence is weak in L2,2(RT ) and λ ∈ (0, 1].
Let us consider now a bounded domain in RT , (0, T )×BR with R fixed. Following the procedure
of [1] p. 641, using the fact that V ni are weak solutions of (3.45) in the sense of definition (3.3), we
obtain that
V ni → Vi, ∇xV ni → ∇xVi,
weakly in L2,2((0, T )× BR) for any R. Hence V i = ∇xVi in the sense of distributions. Note that,
from (3.47), also the limit function satisfies
‖e−µ(1+|x|2)λVi‖22,2,RT + ‖e−µ(1+|x|
2)λ∇xVi‖22,2,RT ≤ C, (3.48)
and Vi ∈ L2[(0, T ), H1,2loc (RT )]. Moreover from estimates (3.47) and Lemma 3 p. 633 of [1] we know
that
‖e−µ(1+|x|2)λVi‖22,∞,RT ≤ C
and hence Vi ∈ L∞
[
(0, T ), L2loc(IR
N )
]
. Finally from Lemma 2 p. 624 of [1] we deduce that
‖V ni ‖2p′,2q′,(0,T )×BR ≤ C
where p′ and q′ are values whose Ho¨lder conjugates p and q satisfy N2p +
1
q ≤ 1. Hence, up to
subsequences, we have V ni → Vi weakly in the space L2p
′,2q′((0, T ) × BR). If we take now a test
function Φ with compact support, then from Definition (3.3), letting n → ∞ it follows that Vi
is a weak solution of the Cauchy problem (3.42) with the required regularity of Definition (3.3).
Moreover following Corollary 3.1 of [1] the sequence (V ni )n converges uniformly to Vi in any compact
subset of RT .
Next let us show estimate (3.44). It is enough to show that for some positive constant C > 0,
|V ni (t, x)| ≤ C(1 + |x|β), ∀(t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× IRN , i = 1, 2.
Let (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × RN be fixed and let (Xt,xs )s∈[t,T ] be the solution of the following stochastic
differential equation:
Xt,xs = x+
∫ s
t
σ(r,Xt,xr )dBs, s ∈ [t, T ] and Xt,xs = x for s ∈ [0, t].
On the other hand let u¯n−11 and u¯
n−1
2 be the stochastic processes defined by: ∀s ∈ [0, T ],
u¯n−11 (s) = u
(n−1)
1 (s,X
t,x
s ,∇xV (n−1)1 (s,Xt,xs )) and u¯n−12 (s) = u(n−1)2 (s,Xt,xs ,∇xV (n−1)2 (s,Xt,xs )).
Finally let P u¯
n−1
1
,u¯n−1
2 be the probability on Ω ([16], pp.200) such that
dP u¯
n−1
1
,u¯n−1
2 = ζT {
∫ .
0
σ−1(s,Xt,xs )Ψ(s,X
t,x
s , u
n−1
1 (s), u
n−1
2 (s))dBs}.dP
where Ψ(s, x, u1, u2) := f1(t, x)u1 + f2(t, x)u2 + ϕ(t, x). Under P
u¯n−1
1
,u¯n−1
2 , the dynamics of Xt,x
is the following:
Xt,xs = x+
∫ s
t
Ψ(s,Xt,xs , u
n−1
1 (s), u
n−1
2 (s))ds +
∫ s
t
σ(r,Xt,xr )dB
u¯n−1
1
,u¯n−1
2
s , for s ∈ [t, T ],
Xt,xs = x for s ∈ [0, t]
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where Bu¯
n−1
1
,u¯n−1
2 is a Brownian motion under P u¯
n−1
1
,u¯n−1
2 .
Thanks to the uniform linear growth of Ψ, we have (see [16], p.306),
Eu¯
n−1
1
,u¯n−1
2 [sup
r≤T
|Xt,xr |β ] ≤ C(1 + |x|β) (3.49)
where C is a constant independent of n. On the other hand as in the proof of Theorem 4.1 of the
next section,
V ni (T − t, x) = Eu¯
n−1
1
,u¯n−1
2 [gi(Xt,xT )]. (3.50)
Now, as gi, i = 1, 2, have polynomial growth (see (3.39)), then by (3.49) there exists a positive
constant C such that, for i = 1, 2,
|V ni (t, x)| ≤ C(1 + |x|β) (3.51)
which is the claim.
Next the local Ho¨lder continuity of Vi follows from its local boundedness (3.44) together with
the Interior Ho¨lder Continuity result recalled in Theorem C p.616 of [1] (one can see also the Ho¨lder
regularity result proved for linear equations in [18], Theorem 10.1, p.204). ✷
To prove the existence of Nash equilibria we look for solutions as in the previous sections, i.e.
that satisfy system (3.42) almost everywhere and that belong to W 1,2q in any bounded subdomain
of RT . Hence we have to introduce a definition of strong solution (it is analogous to the definition
of strong solution (3.1) but we have dropped the boundedness in RT ):
Definition 3.4 (V1, V2) is a strong solution of the system (3.42), if
a) V1(t, x), V2(t, x) ∈ H1+α(ΩT ) ∩W 1,2q (ΩT ), (3.52)
for any bounded subdomain ΩT ⊂ RT , α ∈ (0, 1), q > N + 2 ;
c) Equations (3.42) hold almost everywhere in ΩT and Vi(0, x) = gi(x) holds in Ω.
Using the same technique used to prove Theorem (3.2), we obtain the following result which gives
appropriate regularity of V1, V2 to obtain the existence of Nash equilibria.
Corollary 3.1 Under assumption (A1), (3.38), (3.39) there exists a strong solution of the Cauchy
problem (3.42).
4 Connection with the NZSDG
In the following result we make the connection between the solutions of the PDEs (3.1)-(3.2) (resp.
(3.41); resp. (3.43)), and the NZSDG. This result provides information on the features of the Nash
point of the game which could be useful in several contexts, such as its numerics and simulation,
etc. Note that in bounded domains it is already known (see e.g. [3, 8]).
Theorem 4.1 For i = 1, 2 and (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×IRN , let us set wi(t, x) = V i(T−t, x) where (V 1, V 2)
is a solution of the system (3.1)-(3.2) (resp. (3.29), resp. (3.41)). Then the pair of controls
(u1, u2) = (u1(s), u2(s))s≤T :=
(u1(s,Xs,∇xw1(s,Xs),∇xw2(s,Xs), u2(s,Xs,∇xw1(s,Xs), w2(s,Xs))s≤T
is Nash equilibrium for the nonzero-sum stochastic differential game. Moreover for any t ≤ T ,
wi(t,Xt) = J
i
t (u
1, u2), i.e., (w1(t,Xt), w
2(t,Xt))t≤T are the associated Nash conditional payoffs of
the game.
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Proof. As the functions V i, i = 1, 2, belong to H1+α(ΩT )∩W 1,2q (ΩT ) for any bounded subdomain
ΩT ⊂ RT , α ∈ (0, 1), q > N+2 then also wi, i = 1, 2 have the same regularity. Next let R be fixed.
Therefore one can find two sequences (w1,n)n≥0 and (w
2,n)n≥0 of C1,2([0, T ]×RN) such that: for
i = 1, 2,
(i) (wi,n)n (resp. (∇xwi,n)n) converges uniformly to wi (resp. ∇xwi) in BR,T ;
(ii) (∂tw
i,n)n (resp. (D
2
xxw
i,n)n) converges in L
q(BR,T , dt⊗ dx) to ∂twi (resp. D2xxwi).
Now recall the sequence of stopping times (τR)R≥1 given in (3.14) which is non-decreasing and
converges to T as R→∞. Next making use of Itoˆ’s formula we obtain:
wi,n(τR, XτR) = w
i,n(t ∧ τR, Xt∧τR) +
∫ τR
t∧τR
∇xwi,n(s,Xs)dXs +
∫ τR
t∧τR
Lwi,n(s,Xs)ds (4.1)
where
Lwi,n(t, x) := ∂twi,n(t, x) + 1
2
∑
i,j
aij(t, x)D
2
xixjw
i,n(t, x).
But under condition (2.1), for any s > 0, the random variable Xs has a density p(0, x; s, y)dy which
satisfies (see e.g. [1], p.891 for more details)
1
C1
√
2πs
exp{− 1
2C1s
‖x− y‖2} ≤ p(0, x; s, y) ≤ 1
C2
√
2πs
exp{− 1
2C2s
‖x− y‖2}
for some constants C1 and C2 positive. Therefore for any t ≤ T , we have
E[| ∫ τRt∧τR Lwi,n(s,Xs)ds−∫ τR
t∧τR
Hi(s,Xs,∇xwi(s,Xs), (u1, u2)(s,Xs,∇xw1(s,Xs),∇xw2(s,Xs)))ds|]→n 0.
Going back now to (4.1) and take the limit w.r.t n to obtain: ∀t ≤ T ,
wi(τR, XτR) = w
i(t ∧ τR, Xt∧τR) +
∫ τR
t∧τR
∇xwi(s,Xs)dXs
− ∫ τR
t∧τR
Hi(s,Xs,∇xwi(s,Xs), (u1, u2)(s,Xs,∇xw1(s,Xs),∇xw2(s,Xs)))ds
which implies that
wi(t ∧ τR, Xt∧τR) = Eu1,u2 [wi(τR, XτR)
+
∫ τR
t∧τR
hi(s,Xs, (u1, u2)(s,Xs,∇xw1(s,Xs),∇xw2(s,Xs)))ds|Ft∧τR ]. (4.2)
But
Eu1,u2 [wi(τR, XτR)|Ft∧τR ] = Eu1,u2 [wi(τR, XτR)− gi(XT )|Ft∧τR ] + Eu1,u2 [gi(XT )|Ft∧τR ]
and (Eu1,u2 [wi(τR, XτR) − gi(XT )|Ft∧τR ])R≥1 (resp. (Eu1,u2 [gi(XT )|Ft∧τR ])R≥1) converges to 0
(resp. Eu1,u2 [gi(XT )|Ft]) in L1(dPu1,u2) as R→∞. Then
lim
R→∞
Eu1,u2 [wi(τR, XτR)|Ft∧τR ]
L1(Pu1,u2 )
= Eu1,u2 [gi(XT )|Ft].
In the same way we deal with the second term of (4.2) to obtain
limR→∞E
u1,u2 [
∫ τR
t∧τR
hi(s,Xs, u
1(s), u2(s))ds|Ft∧τR ]
L1(Pu1,u2)
= Eu1,u2 [
∫ T
t
hi(s,Xs, u
1(s), u2(s))ds|Ft].
Therefore take the limit w.r.t R in both hand-sides of (4.2) to deduce that
wi(t,Xt) = J
i
t (u
1, u2), ∀t ≤ T ; i = 1, 2.
Next let us fix i = 1 and let u1 := (u1t)t≤T be an admissible control for the first player. For t ≤ T
let us set
J1t (u1, u2) = E
u,u2 [
∫ T
t
h1(s,Xs, u1s, u2(s))ds+ g
1(XT )|Ft].
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Therefore by the representation property one can find a progressively measurable process Z1,u1 =
(Z1,u1t )t≤T such that for any t ≤ T ,
J1t (u1, u2) = g
1(XT ) +
∫ T
t
H1(s,Xs, σ
−1(t,Xt)
⊤Z1,u1s , u1s, u2(s))ds−
∫ T
t
Z1,u1s dBs.
Taking into account of (A0), (GIC condition) it implies that
w1(t ∧ τR, Xt∧τR)− J1t∧τR(u1, u2) ≥ Eu1,u2 [w1(τR, XτR)− J1τR(u1, u2)|Ft∧τR ].
Take now the limit as R → ∞ to obtain w1(t,Xt) − J1t (u1, u2) ≥ 0 since w1(T,XT ) = g1(XT ) =
J1T (u1, u2) and the probabilities P
u1,u2 and P are equivalent. Thus for any t ≤ T , J1t (u1, u2) ≥
J1t (u1, u2) for any admissible control u1 of the first player π1. In the same way one can show that
J2t (u1, u2) ≥ J2t (u1, u2) for any admissible control u2 of the second player π2. Take now t = 0
in the previous inequalities to deduce that J10 (u1, u2) ≥ J10 (u1, u2) and J20 (u1, u2) ≥ J20 (u1, u2)
which means that (u1, u2) is Nash equilibrium point for the NZSDG. Finally note that w
i(t,Xt) =
J it (u1, u2), i = 1, 2 and then (w
1(t,Xt), w
2(t,Xt))t≤T are the Nash conditional payoffs of the
NZSDG. ✷
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